Posted by
Big Mo on Saturday, November 04, 2006 7:19:16 PM
Title: Grant Author: Jean Edward Smith
Publisher: Simon & Schuster
Date: 2001
Rating: 4 ½ stars out of 5
What this book is / is not This is an incomplete yet critically important, meaty one-volume history of the life of Ulysses S. Grant, the victor of the Civil War and 18th president of the United States. Smith’s examination of key aspects of Grant’s two administrations is vitally important to understanding a man who is wrongly labeled a failed president.
Smith offers nothing new concerning Grant’s Civil War service. Readers looking for an in-depth examination would do better with Brooks Simpson’s superior
Triumph Over Adversity and Bruce Catton’s classic
Grant Moves South and
Grant Takes Command. However, as an introduction to Grant, and an objective, honest overview of Grant’s presidency, Smith’s book serves quite nicely.
Main thesis/ jaw droppersI’ve combined these two sections because historians have indeed gotten Grant wrong—often deliberately so. All of these are more or less jaw-droppers, because they fly in the face of everything you’d hear about Grant in history textbooks, on Wikipedia and elsewhere. This is the real Grant, as his contemporaries knew and recalled him:
First. He was the original “civil rights” president. During Grant’s eight years, he pressed for civil rights long after the country as a whole had tired of “waving the bloody shirt” in support of the freedmen. The general-turned-president spent his eight years in office making sure the “verdict” of Appomattox was not overturned. The Justice Department was formed under Grant specifically to enforce federal authority in the South and preserve the rights of the freedmen. Two of Grant’s attorneys general, Amos T. Ackerman and then George H. Williams, oversaw Grant’s presidential Reconstruction policies through the five Enforcement Acts and the Ku Klux Klan Act. Through their actions—driven by Grant—they smashed the Klan and thereby rendered it impotent for 50 years. Thanks to Grant’s forceful actions, violence in the South against freedmen dropped, and it was only when the threat of reprisal was removed that violence escalated again.
Grant’s support for the 13th amendment before he became president was instrumental to its passage, and the 14th and 15th amendments became law based on President Grant’s full and unswerving support. He suspended habeas corpus and sent in federal troops to enforce suffrage for blacks, believing that the freedmen should enjoy the same political rights as anyone else. The 1872 elections, which Grant won in a landslide, were the fairest in the South until the 1960s. He tried to annex Santo Domingo (modern-day Dominican Republic) not, as has been long thought, in a bungled attempt to add territory to the US. Rather, Grant sought to make the black-dominated island into three or four US states on the theory that if they were successful, then they would serve as models for successful, peaceful government dominated by blacks. The annexation effort of course failed, and whether it was noble or wrongheaded is beside the point: it was an example of novel thinking from someone dismissed as a dullard.
Second. Grant’s secretary of state was one of the most celebrated in the nation’s history, Hamilton Fish. With Grant’s full support, Fish enacted methods of international arbitration that are still used and served as the part of the foundation of the United Nations. Through Fish, Grant made peace with England over Civil War claims, thereby strengthening and deepening the ties between our two nations. It would be fair (well, almost) to say that our true friendship with England began during Grant’s presidency.
Third. Grant avoided war with Spain over Cuba—twice—despite enormous public and congressional pressure. He knew that the desire to add Havana to the Union was motivated by nothing more than greed. Thirty years later we would fight the highly dubious Spanish-American War—and Grant probably would have disapproved.
Fourth. On the financial/economic front, Grant prevented the greedy cornering of the gold market by Jay Gould and Jim Fisk in a brilliant counter-stroke that flooded the market with government gold (instead of the small amount regularly scheduled to be sold). Contrary to what “history” says, the actual paper record proves that Grant was not fooled by what Gould and Fisk planned and warned his treasury secretary a full two weeks in advance of what they were scheming and to prepare accordingly.
In his second term, Grant single-handedly prevented the amazingly harmful inflation bill of 1874 from becoming law. Designed by a Congress and Wall Street desperate to do something to combat the Panic of 1873 (an economic depression second only to the Great Depression), the bill would have creamed the already-struggling economy while benefiting only a few. Immediately following that victory, Grant supported the Resumption of specie payment Act of 1875, thereby restoring US credit and avoided turning a financial crisis into a financial disaster. The Panic ended abruptly when the act became effective in 1879.
Grant also reduced taxes, cut the deficit by $435 million and national debt by $300 million. In sum, Grant pursued what today would be considered fiscally conservative policies, which stopped inflation, raised the nation’s credit, and reduced taxes and the national debt in response to the absolutely worst economic crisis America had ever faced up to that time.
Fifth. Elsewhere on the domestic front, Grant made a true effort to make peace with the Plains Indian tribes, thereby in all likelihood saving them from extermination. Western states supported Grant in 1868 on the mistaken belief that he—the man who destroyed the Confederacy—would eradicate the “Indian problem” once and for all. They were wrong. In the army in the 1850s Grant wrote to his wife Julia that he knew the Indians were getting shafted left and right, and when he became president, Grant reversed U.S. policy and promoted comprehensive reform designed to bring peace. Of course “Custer’s Last Stand” occurred during the final year of his administration due to Grant’s mistaken trust in Sheridan; but Grant’s policy usually was to punish those who did wrong while making fair and just peace with those who wanted peace. In fact, it’s very similar to Bush’s approach to Islamic terror.
Grant believed in treating Indians as individuals instead of just tribes. When the famed Red Cloud and other Plains chiefs visited Washington in 1870, Grant treated them just shy of visiting heads of state. Not for nothing did the Plains Indians refer specifically to Grant as “great white father.”
He pressed for citizenship for Indians—a remarkably progressive stance for the 1870s and something no president had ever before done—and sought to treat them fairly by replacing corrupt Indian agents with (presumably) un-corruptible Quakers. The corrupt agents were one of the biggest causes of troubles on the Plains. He also created a blue-ribbon panel for Indian affairs to bypass the congressional logjam on Indian appropriations, and placed his longtime friend Ely Parker—himself a Seneca chief—in charge of Indian affairs. Finally, Grant utterly refused to abandon his peace policy just to win votes in the west. Grant swept the west in 1872 except for Texas, which had to do more with Reconstruction than the peace policy.
Sixth. Grant was the only president between Lincoln and McKinley to win re-election to back-to-back terms. He won re-election in a landslide, counting among his supporters the western states, most every single black man and progressives. He crushed the liberal-Republican/Democrat alliance arrayed to defeat him—as effectively as he crushed Rebel armies in Tennessee and Virginia.
Seventh. Grant shepherded the nation through an intensely complex era that immediately followed on the heels of a decade of tremendous upheaval—especially with his calm and non-partisan handling of the election crisis of 1876, where Democrat Tilden won the popular vote but the electoral college vote was in dispute. In fact, his handling of the crisis was much better than Clinton’s in 2000. Clinton was a non-entity; Grant made sure order prevailed and the transition was peaceful, and inserted himself into the crisis in order to solve it.
To sum up points one through seven, few presidents have had to deal with such internal turmoil as Grant did.
Eighth. Yes, there were scandals. But unlike some of Grant’s successors (including a certain turkey from Arkansas), Grant was not the epicenter of scandal. And many of the scandals actually occurred during Johnson’s unfortunate term and only came to light during Grant’s terms (as has happened to George W. Bush). Other scandals merely occurred during Grant’s terms but had nothing to do with him or his administration, such as Boss Tweed and Tamany Hall. As for the “scandals” that Grant’s own people caused, it was Grant’s administration that exposed them: mainly, the Credit Mobilier scandal, which occurred before Grant became president, and the Whiskey scandal, which included some low-ranking members of his administration and would eventually bring accusations—proven unfounded—against his primary secretary, Babcock. Grant made sure that no one guilty would go unpunished—even longtime friends. But when it became clear to Grant that his attorney general, Bristow, was aiming to destroy Grant’s aide and friend Babcock in a bald attempt to win the graces of the reformers and get elected president, Grant sheltered Babcock. Grant’s defense of Babcock, done in an unprecedented five-hour closed session, ended the matter and satisfied (at the time) many of his harshest critics. But these days his defense of Babcock has been taken as evidence of corruption by protecting a crony—but really it was shielding someone from an unjust witch-hunt.
At the same time, the nature of some of the “scandals” are willfully misunderstood, as they involved the spoils system, which all presidents to that point had used without protest. Grant was the first president to press for the creation of a civil service to eliminate the spoils system. The so-called reformers, who supposedly longed for civil service reform, accused Grant of corruption primarily because Grant did not appoint them to posts! (Grant abandoned the attempt late in his second term; it took the murder of President Garfield—himself a “reformer”—for civil service to be reformed under Chester A. Arthur.)
Does the author succeed?Yes, admirably so.
Criticism As stated, Smith offers nothing new on Grant’s Civil War career, but this book is satisfactory for the reader or student new to Grant.
More anecdotes of Grant’s life would have made this a better book. It could have also used a more complete, slower exposition of the last year of Grant’s life and the struggle to write his amazing
Memoirs.
Main takeaway lessonsSo why does President Grant have such a lousy reputation? It’s because the history of his presidency was written by and large by his political and personal enemies (See Frank Scaturro,
President Grant Reconsidered, reviewed above). Grant became a victim of “the Lost Cause,” wherein the Confederates were the natural inheritors of the Revolutionary mantle and were overwhelmed by Lincoln’s “illegal war.” (To see this in action, read
The Tragic Era by Claude Bowers, 1928, a member of the Dunning school. Then read W.E.B. DuBois’
Black Reconstruction in America, written as a response to the Dunning school. Then read Eric Foner’s definitive 1987
Reconstruction, America’s Unfinished Revolution.)
So with white supremacists controlling the history of Reconstruction for almost 100 years after his presidency ended, Grant, who fought for civil rights, needed to be destroyed. Grant’s contemporary enemies also proved far more prolific with their condemnations than his supporters were with their praises. Grant’s 1872 victory and vigorous enforcement of Reconstruction soured Grant before the intellectual class—including historians. And later-day lazy, unthinking, uncritical or Lost Cause sympathizing historians have accepted their biased verdict without question. While Smith’s book is wanting in a few areas, it is a much-needed attempt to demonstrate that Grant’s good sense did not desert him in the White House.
He did have faults, of course. He often was too trusting of people—which often got him into trouble—and he managed the military’s and the nation’s finances a lot better than his own. He did have a drinking problem, but after it cost him his first military career, he made damn sure it never hurt him like that again. (Almost every single report about him being drunk during the war or after is false and usually malicious in nature.)
In sum: Grant saved the Union three times. First by winning the war, second by winning the peace at Appomattox, and third by preserving the peace as president. He is now under-appreciated, underestimated, misunderstood and undeserving of his presidency’s lousy reputation. If there was such a creature as historical justice, Grant would be immortalized on Mount Rushmore.
Do I recommend this book?Without hesitation.
Modern applicationsUlysses S. Grant and George W. Bush have a lot in common: both men in their times were beset by academics, journalists, career politicians and self-anointed “elites” who considered them stupid, incompetent, corrupt and failures. Rumors concerning them are given wide consideration and accepted as truth, without evidence, by their enemies. Both men are awkward public speakers, but they each have their forte: Bush is great when he’s on fire, and Grant was brilliant with the written word.
But both men had visions for America that transcended their presidencies: Grant had Reconstruction, and Bush has the war against Islamic terrorism, for which Iraq is the centerpiece. Both actions were unpopular, but neither man took a poll to decide whether he should do it. Both men looked to a prior critical event as justification for “stubbornly” continuing what media, critics, elites, political opponents, etc., decried as an unpopular, failed and unnecessary policy: the Civil War for Grant, of course, and 9/11 for Bush. Grant spent his entire presidency determined that the “verdict” of Appomattox not be overturned, and Bush has, since Sept. 11, 2001, been determined that another such attack not happen—not ever. Both visions for America, and the actions that they took, had repercussions far beyond their presidencies.
In Grant’s case, there was massive pushback in the South; when Grant’s party abandoned him, and by extension, free blacks in the south, civil rights for black Americans was postponed for 100 years. In Bush’s case, the jihadists who seek our destruction have flocked to Iraq, making our job much more difficult there. Failure in Iraq—leaving will be seen as failure, by our enemies’ own words—will embolden our enemy like nothing else has before, and will mean a much, much more dangerous world than the one we live in now.
Neither man sought failure. Both wanted to win. Grant wanted victory with Reconstruction as much as he sought victory over the Confederacy. But eventually even his party abandoned Grant because they grew tired of the cause, and believed it would never work. Democrats, I believe, abandoned the Iraq cause when it became politically expedient to do so—if they ever truly supported it to begin with; the same goes with squishy Republicans. If the GOP abandons Bush’s policies in Iraq like the party abandoned Grant late in his second term over Reconstruction, the consequences for the world—not just the nation—will be severe. It will be the same for whoever succeeds Bush, because Grant’s successor, Hayes, ended Reconstruction as part of the election compromise—effectively abandoning blacks to the mercies of Democrat white supremacists.